Prior to the military regime of 1973-90, Chile's Congress was widely regarded as among the strongest legislatures in Latin America, largely because of the nature of its party system. In the wake of the transition back to democracy, the role of both Congress and the nature of the legislative party system are open to question. This paper examines the nature of legislative careers, the leadership institutions of Congress (committees and mesas directivas), and patterns of floor voting in the Chamber of Deputies to evaluate the relative importance of Chile's traditional parties and the two new main coalitions in structuring legislative behavior. I conclude that the coalitions are more important institutional actors than has been recognized by most of the literature on the post-transition Chilean Congress.
Introduction
Chile's Congress has conventionally been regarded as among the most effective in Latin America in representing diverse interests and influencing policy. Analyses of Chilean politics prior to the 1973 coup consistently point to the strength of Chilean parties to support this evaluation. Valenzuela (1994) , for example, argues for the adoption of a parliamentarism in Chile largely on the grounds that its party system resembles those of western European parliamentary democracies. Mainwaring and Scully (1995) point to the stability of support for Chilean parties among the electorate, their ideological consistency, and the strength of national party organizations. In the 1990s, after the return to democracy, the central questions are whether and how the Chilean legislative party system is different from the pre-authoritarian period, and what are the implications for the effectiveness of the Congress.
Accounts of Chilean politics at mid-century portray a system characterized by parties with widespread membership and activism at the grassroots, prominent parliamentary leaders, and highly articulated national policy agendas that were spread across a broad ideological spectrum (Scully 1995; Valenzuela + Wilde 1979) . This portrait stands in sharp contrast to that of party systems in neighboring Argentina (McGuire 1994) , Brazil (Mainwaring, forthcoming) , and Peru (Cotler 1994) , where personalism and clientelism were endemic, weakening the ability of legislatures to act collectively and to compete with strong presidents in shaping policy.
In addition to portraying a highly institutionalized party system, the literature on Chilean politics emphasizes that coalitions among legislative parties were highly fluid (Agor 1971) .
Between 1932-73, for example, Valenzuela (1994:123-25) identifies 19 separate coalitions among legislative parties in support of the eight presidents who served during this period. The mean 1 coalition lifespan during this period was thus 2.1 years, with the longest-surviving coalition lasting five years, from 1932-37. The Chilean Congress was a center of partisan compromise and 3
The coalition of the right has gone by a different name in each of the three post-transition 2 elections: Democracy and Progress in 1989, Union for Progress in 1993, and Union for Chile in 1997. In every election, it has included a handful of independents and regional party candidates in a few districts, but over 90% of its nominations are awarded to candidates of either the National Renovation (RN) or Independent Democratic Union (UDI). dealmaking, and served as an effective counterweight to the presidency up through the 1960s.
From the late 1950s through the early '70s, however, a series of electoral and constitutional reforms undermined incentives for cooperation, both among parties and between the branches (Shugart + Carey 1992) . In an increasingly ideologically polarlized environment, these reforms contributed to the stand-off between Salvador Allende's Popular Unity coalition and the parties on the right, which preceded the military coup of 1973 (Valenzuela 1994; Valenzuela and Wilde 1979) .
The transition to democracy in Chile in 1990 raised a number of issues about the roles and performance of the newly reestablished legislature. General Augusto Pinochet 's 1980 Constitution, even as amended in 1988, provides for a presidency with extensive formal powers, including the capacity to control the legislative agenda (Siavelis 1998; Baldez + Carey 1999) . The establishment of a large bloc of generally conservative, non-elected senators has served as a brake on policy changes and proposed institutional reforms (Arriagada 1994) . With respect to the parties themselves, the most prominent post-transition question is whether the new, two-member district (M=2) electoral system imposed by the outgoing military regime fundamentally alters the party system.
In this chapter, I argue that the post-transition Chilean legislative party system differs from the mid-century system portrayed in previous literature in at least one important way: throughout the decade of the 1990s, it has been characterized by the stability and cohesiveness of the two main legislative coalitions: the Concertación on the center-left, and the coalition of the right. 2 The centrality of the coalitions to Chilean politics in the 1990s, moreover, is a product of the M=2 reform of the electoral system. The coalitions co-exist with the party organizations that are their main component parts. In conjunction with the traditional parties, they organize nominations for legislative elections, the legislative committee system, and floor voting. In the first post-transition decade, the coalitions themselves have resembled parties composed of multiple factions. The composition of the first three congresses, by party and coalition, are shown in Table 1 .
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The military government also changed the method of presidential election. Until 1970, if no 3 candidate won >50% in the first round, then Congress selected the winner from among the two top [ Table 1] Throughout this chapter, I shall present data on political careers, the committee structure, and voting in the Chilean Chamber of Deputies since the transition to democracy. In order to make a conclusive case about changes in the party system, it would be necessary to provide analogous data for the pre-1973 period as well. Unfortunately, systematic evidence from the earlier era does not exist -or at least has escaped my search up to now. The bases of intertemporal comparison, therefore, are scholarly accounts of legislative politics in that period.
The current data from Chile also provide the basis for cross-national comparison with the other Latin American legislatures examined in this volume. To the extent that we can draw conclusions about legislative capacity by examining legislative organization and the structure of political careers, as Morgenstern suggests in his introductory chapter, Chile is an ideal case for study because information on the Congress is readily available to scholars, including a number of excellent internet sites.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I review the changes in the legislative electoral system established by the outgoing military regime, emphasizing the incentives this created for cross-party coalitions. Next, I review the early literature on the post-transition Chilean party system, focusing on divergent expectations and evaluations of levels of fragmentation and polarization. Then I begin empirical analysis of legislative parties and coalitions throughout the first decade after the return to civilian rule, examining legislative careers, the committee system, and floor voting in turn.
The transition and the M=2 reform
In 1988, the government of General Pinochet lost a plebiscite on its continuation for another eight years by a margin of 56 -44%. Grudgingly accepting the defeat, the military government prepared to conduct open elections -the first in sixteen years -in 1989. In doing so, the military government handed down a new electoral law, changing the manner of election for Congress. 3   5 candidates. As of 1989, the two top candidates would compete in a run-off election if no one wins >50% in the first round. For discussions of the effects of this change, see Carey (1994 and .
Before the coup of 1973, legislators had been elected from districts ranging in magnitude (M) from 1 to over 20, with a mean M=5.3 (Nohlen 1993) . Beginning with the 1989 election, all elected legislators are chosen from two-member (M=2) districts. The entire Chamber of Deputies is elected -with two members drawn from each of 60 districts. The Senate is composed of both elected and non-elected members. The 38 elected members are drawn, two each, from 19 districts, for staggered eight-year terms. The Constitution of 1980 also provides for nine designated members -appointed respectively by the military (4), the Supreme Court (3), and the president (2) -and for lifetime senate seats for former presidents who have served six or more years in office.
As before the coup, the new system provides for open ballot lists. Voters indicate a preference for an individual candidate within a list of up to two candidates; all votes for candidates within each list are pooled together to determine the distribution of seat among lists; then seats are allocated to those candidates from seat-winning lists in the order of their individual vote totals. In Chile, the practical effect is that both candidates on a list can be selected only if that list more than doubles the vote total of the second-place list; otherwise the top candidate from each of the first two lists is elected. Quite frequently, these are not the two top individual vote-getters.
Another key element of the new system is the cross-party coalition list. Electoral coalitions in the form of apparentment lists had actually been common in Chile, and had encouraged cooperation across parties, until prohibited by an electoral law reform in 1958 (Valenzuela 1994) . Under apparentment, allied parties nominate candidates and present lists that appear separately on the ballot, but the vote totals of allied parties are pooled before seats are distributed (Lijphart 1994) . In the new Chilean system, coalition lists straddle the structure of typical party lists on the one hand, and apparentment on the other. Each coalition's candidates appear together on a list with the coalition's name at the top and the candidate's party's symbol beside her or his name below. This means that the coalitions must negotiate a common list of candidates in each district prior to the election. Given that the major coalitions have included 6 c.f. Laakso + Taagepera (1979) for a discussion of the concept of "effective number of parties." 4 more than two parties in each election, it also means that in every district, some party(ies) must agree not to run candidates.
Under M=2, intra-coalition negotiations prior to each election over the distribution of candidates across districts have resembled the internal deliberations among factions within parties over list composition. Parties confront the need to trade their electoral presence in some districts, as well as the freedom to press policy priorities at odds with the larger coalition, in exchange for coalition membership. Negotiations over nominations and policy are therefore a constant source of tension within each coalition, but because only the top two lists can win representation in any district, the incentive to maintain the coalitions has so far prevailed.
Initial evaluations of the post-transition party system: fragmentation and polarization

Fragmentation
Proponents of the M=2 reform claimed that it would discourage fragmentation of the legislative party system, according to the well-known logic that low magnitude reduces the viability of small parties, thus decreasing the effective number of parties winning votes and seats (Duverger 1954; Taagepera + Shugart 1989; Cox 1997) . How one assesses this claim depends 4 on whether one regards the traditional parties or the broader electoral coalitions as the relevant units of analysis.
Most of the current literature on Chile focuses on the traditional parties. The persistence of independent party organizations, public disagreements over policy, and the competing ambitions of presidential aspirants -all among parties within the same coalitions -are cited as evidence that the coalitions are marriages of convenience at election time, whereas the parties are far more important as independent actors (Scully 1995; Valenzuela 1994; Siavelis 1997 ). On these grounds, the answer to whether the M=2 reform reduced the fragmentation of the Chilean party system is clearly no. Siavelis (1997) shows that, whether one simply counts the number of parties winning Chamber representation or relies on conventional concentration indexes, such as those of Laakso and Taagepera (1979) or Molinar (1991) , the number of legislative parties has 7 Both authors note, correctly, that tallying national vote shares of parties from these hypothesized 5 blocs is a dubious exercise, given that no party runs candidates in every district, and the very nomination decisions that determine how many votes each party actually competes for are endogenous to the coalition organizations themselves. It is not clear, therefore, on what grounds such national-level vote shares should be considered evidence for the persistence of party system fragmentation. not declined in the post-transition era relative to mid-century. Siavelis (1997) and Scully (1995) also emphasize that, if one ignores coalitional alliances and divides Chilean parties, pre-coup and post-transition alike, into Left, Center, and Right blocs, then the national vote shares of candidates from parties in each bloc show striking continuity across both periods.
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Conversely, if one were to assume that the coalitions are the relevant units of analysis in the Chilean system, then the conclusion that fragmentation has been reduced would be inescapable. Table 2 [ Table 2] The bottom line here is that the conclusion one reaches with respect to the effect of the M=2 reform on fragmentation depends on what entities one counts. Although I shall not suggest that the traditional parties should be disregarded, my emphasis here is on the importance of the coalitions in the post-transition Chilean Congress.
Polarization
Some proponents of M=2 contend that the reform discourages extremism in electoral competition and legislative bargaining (Rabkin 1996) . These accounts hold that coalition reputations are meaningful to voters independent of party labels, and that the existence of coalitions necessarily encourages moderation. For example, Guzmán (1993) contends:
Because the M=2 system rewards large majorities, parties will quickly tend to unite and coalesce into alliances to reach higher combined vote shares than they could win individually. This encourages parties to engage in negotiations that require moderation of their positions. In this sense, the coalitions that the system 'forces' generate collective outcomes that reflect more than the individual support of each party (p.309).
In advancing the case that M=2 encourages moderation, both Guzmán (1993) and Rabkin (1996) invoke Downs's (1957) well-known arguments about partisan competition in SMD plurality systems, arguing that Chile's move from high M to M=2 is a step toward Downs's centrist result.
Criticisms of this argument fall along both empirical and theoretical lines. Many experts on Chilean politics regard the persistence of traditional parties as conclusive evidence against the effects of the reforms (Siavelis and Valenzuela 1991; Scully 1995; Valenzuela 1994; Siavelis 1997 ). Valenzuela (1994) , for example, states:
"The key to understanding Chilean politics, even after a lengthy authoritarian interlude, is the existence of several important political currents with strong party representation and clear Left, Center, and Right referents. The challenge for strengthening Chilean democracy is not the illusory and counterproductive attempt to destroy the party system or change the underlying ideological attachments of voters. The military government clearly failed in this endeavor. The challenge for Chile is to structure mechanisms to bridge the centrifugal realities of Chilean politics..." (p.137).
The principal claim here is that the Chilean party system traditionally has had a tripartite character which persists despite the coalitions that the M=2 reform makes imperative at election time. For Scully (1995) the: "chief conclusion ... is that the underlying patterns and tendencies within the Chilean political landscape are quite resistant to fundamental change. A key genetic feature, from the mid-nineteenth century on, is that party politics in Chile tends to divide among three fundamental politcal segments, right, center, and left.
The tripartite (or tres tercios) description of the party system refers both to voter attachments and to legislative behavior. Scully (1995) emphasizes the former when he shows that in response to the survey question, "Do you feel closer to the right, left, or center?" the percentages of respondents who locate themselves in each category has been fairly stable and even from 1958 to 1993. Scully interprets these data as evidence that the party system is "still manifestly tripartite" (p.133). He does not, however, consider whether the result is merely a product of the survey question, which is explicitly tripartite.
Alternatively, the tripartite description at times refers to historical patterns of coalitions among parties. Valenzuela (1994) 
Legislative Careers
In the introductory chapter to this volume, Morgenstern and Nacif suggest that most prominent theories of legislative behavior work on the assumption that incumbents are motivated to sustain political careers. Students of the U.S. Congress, for example, where re-nomination and reelection rates are extraordinarily high, have grown accustomed to the assumption that, regardless of legislators' actual motivations, their behavior can be modeled as though they were pure reelection-seekers (Mayhew 1974) . In Latin America, however, reelection rates vary substantially across countries, and in many cases the assumption that legislative behavior is primarily motivated by reelection is unwarranted (Carey 1996; Weldon 1997 ). Before we can generate any expectations about Chilean legislative behavior based on a theory of ambition, therefore, it is necessary to determine whether Chilean legislators seek to build careers in Congress itself, use
In interviews, legislators and party officials from both coalitions agreed that the parties 6 themselves are hesitant to deny renomination to incumbents who seek it (Kuschel 1998; Canales 1998) . In large part, this is because incumbents tend to have personal reputations and name recognition that are important electoral assets in their districts (Melero 1998; Orpis 1998; Paya 1998) . Of course, one's party endorsement is only the first step toward being renominated for the coalition, particularly within the Concertacion, where there are always more parties demanding spots on the ballot than the two nominations available in each district (Canales 1998) . The slightly higher rate of incumbent renomination in the coalition of the Right may be due to the fact that it is dominated in almost all districts exclusively by two parties.
In all cases, these are deputies who switched into or out of one of the major coalitions to/from 7 minor lists. In no cases, has a deputy switched from one of the major coalitions to the other. The stability of party and coalition membership among legislators in Chile is striking, particularly in contrast to the frequency of party switching in Brazil (Desposato 1997 ).
Congress as a springboard for other public office, or leave politics altogether after serving in the legislature. If the primary career path is within the legislature itself, institutions that structure legislative behavior -such as committees, and party and coalition leadership -should be important to legislators and to the operation and effectiveness of the legislature as a whole (Polsby 1968; Krehbiel 1991 , Cox + McCubbins, Mainwaring + Scully 1995 .
Electoral data from Chile since the transition show that most legislators seek careers in Congress and that they can reasonably expect success along these lines. Tables 3 and 4 show renomination and reelection rates for the Chamber of Deputies, broken down by party and by coalition, for the 1989-93 and 1993-97 periods. Overall levels of reelection do not differ substantially, either across coalitions or among parties within coalitions.
average, and reelection rates are slightly below 50%. Given that senators tend to be older, that terms are eight years rather than four, and that progressive ambition does not lead senators to run for the Chamber, a lower rate of reelection-seeking and success is to be expected.
[ Table 5 ]
The preceding tables demonstrate that it is entirely appropriate to apply theories premised on reelectoral ambition to the Chilean Congress. One other way to cut these data is to consider the overall levels of legislative experience that the reelection rates generate. As of the December 1997 election, in which the Chamber was renewed in its entirety and 20 of the elected Senate seats were contested, each Chamber seat has now been contested three times and each Senate seat twice. The composition of the Congress that serving the 1998-2001 term is described in Table 6 .
[ Table 6 ] As the reelection data suggested, levels of experience do not vary much across coalitions or among the major parties. The Chamber is about equally divided among those in their first, second, and third terms; and the Senate among those in their first and second terms and those with prior Chamber experience.
Substantial majorities of legislators in both houses, in both coalitions, and across all parties have prior legislative experience. If current reelection rates persist through the next few elections, the overall level of experience of the Chilean Congress will rise further. Given that every election spells four or eight years of service, current reelection rates suggest that the average tenure of Chilean legislators will quickly approach that of member of theU.S. Congress (cites). It is clear, then, that reelection matters to the vast majority of Chilean legislators and that the stability and experience of Congress provide an environment in which stable and effective legislative institutions can be expected to re-develop.
The organization of Congress
Mesas
The fundamental institutions of both chambers of Congress are the executive boards (mesas) and the permanent committees, whose members are elected by majority votes in each respective chamber. The Chamber's mesa includes a president as well as a first and second vice-12 president; the Senate's consists only of a president and a single vice-president. The rules of both the Chamber and Senate establish that the mesas serve for four-year terms, and that they are not collegial bodies; rather, their powers are formally centralized in the presidents, with vicepresidents substituting in case of the president's absence or sickness (Reglamentos de la Cámara de Diputados, Art.44; Reglamento del Senado, Arts.21,23). Christian Democratic Deputy
Roberto León (1998) , however, suggests more flexibility in how leadership of the mesas is exercised -at least in the Chamber -desrcibing a negotiated agreement within the Concertación by which the presidency would rotate from the Christian Democrats to the Socialists, to the PPD, and back, over the four years of the current Congress. This sort of consensual power-sharing agreement, if it can be sustained, appears to be essential to the survival of the Concertación.
The authorities of the mesas, as outlined in the Chamber and Senate rules run along the lines of those of most assembly directorates -they are responsible for communications between chambers, with the executive, and with the public; and they have some control over the legislative agenda and committee assignments. These latter two points are particularly important, and warrant some more comment.
Regarding control of the legislative agenda, both chamber presidents are given some formal authority in the respective reglamentos -in the case of the Chamber, to determine what matters are subject to "immediate versus non-urgent dispatch" (Art.44:4), and in the Senate "to direct debate, distributing and ordering discussion of matters and limiting the number and duration of statements, when necessary to ensure the adoption of resolutions" (Art.23:2). Mesa presidents also direct the flow of legislative traffic through discretion on the referral of bills to legislative committees, an authority that can affect the prospects for a proposal's success, depending on committee composition (Alzamora 1998; also cites on bill referral power in U.S. Congress).
These measures of agenda control, however, are regularly overridden in practice by the president's constitutional authority to dominate the legislative agenda by declaring his proposed bills urgent, as Siavelis's chapter in this volume shows. Thus, although the formal agenda control of officers of the Chilean Congress within the legislature is akin to that found elsewhere, the existence of strong constitutional agenda powers in the executive mitigates the effectiveness of this authority by the mesas somewhat.
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There is a subtle, but potentially important, difference between the chambers here. The 8 Chamber rules determine that the president names all committee members "with the agreement of the Chamber" (Art.44:2). In the Senate, by contrast, "committee members are elected by the Senate at the president's proposal ... The president's proposals will not be debated and are tacitly approved if there are no objections." However, if the Senate president's proposal for a particular committee is rejected, the positions on that committee are filled in the next session by cumulative vote, whereby each senator is afforded as many votes as there are positions on the committee and may distribute these votes across candidates as s/he prefers, including allocating more than one vote to a particular candidate (Reglamento, Art.30). This particular voting method is frequently advocated as a means of preventing majorities from swamping the will of minorities with intense preferences (Guinier). According to Senator Manuel Antonio Mata (DC), however, the committee assignment process has always been consensual enough that presidential proposals have not been challenged.
When amendments generate different versions of the same bill in each chamber, the respective 9 committee members, plus an additional eight senators (such that each chamber has equal membership) participate on conference committees to resolve the differences, and to report uniform legislation back to the respective chambers for floor votes.
In both chambers, the mesa president considers requests from deputies, filtered through their respective bancadas (partisan blocs), for desired committee assignments, then presents proposed committee rosters to the respective chambers for ratification. In interviews, legislators 8 from various parties concurred that the process of committee assignments is consensual, and that mesa presidents honor the assignment requests of from the various bancadas (Kuschel, Mata) .
Committees
Most of the substantive policymaking work of Congress is conducted in the committees of each chamber. Legislation introduced to each chamber is routinely referred to one of the seventeen permanent committees, where hearings are held and amendments are considered.
Ordinary legislation can die in committee for lack of majority support, and the fate of bills on which floor action is required (e.g. executive proposals under urgency provisions) is influenced by committee recommendations. Table 7 , which presents data on Chamber committee membership from 1997, and then at the beginning of the 1998-2001 Congress, illustrates that such uniformity at the partisan level is not strictly maintained.
[ Table 7] At the coalitional level, the Concertación maintains a majority, of either 7:6 or 8:5 on all committees at all times. At the partisan level, the proportionality rule is observed in the aggregate, but not in the particular case for each committee. That is, the overall number of committee posts assigned to each party mirrors its share of Chamber seats, but there are many instances of particular committees in which proportionality across parties within coalitions is not observed.
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There is a change between the two congresses in the distribution of committee chairs. In 1997, five of seventeen were held by members of the opposition, whereas ten of the remaining twelve were occupied by Christian Democrats. At the beginning of the 1998-2001 Congress, the majority coalition has asserted its a near-monopoly over chairs, holding 16 of 17, while simultaneously distributing them more proportionally within the coalition itself. The columns Repeat, Reappointed, and Experience, respectively indicate whether the same person held the chair for successive periods, whether the former chair (if reelected) still serves on the committee, and whether the current chair served previously on the committee. Unlike in the United States, committee chairs do not normally retain their posts from one congress to the next. Instead, the coalitions work out agreements by which committee chairmanships rotate (Kuschel 1998; León 1998 ). When they are reelected, however, they generally remain on the committee, and those selected as chairs generally have prior experience on the committee.
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The importance of committee composition, and its relationship to the coalition structure of Congress, are best illustrated through an extended quotation from Deputy Andrés Palma (during the 1994-97 Congress) with respect to budget legislation:
An agriculture bill might not go through the Agriculture Committee, but it has to go through the Finance (Hacienda) Committee if it affects the budget. That is, it will generally pass through Agriculture and then go to Finance, but if the bill came with urgency from the executive for immediate discussion, it would go straight to Finance without going through Agriculture, although the subject is agriculture, because it affects the budget. Because of this, we've been particularly concerned that the composition of the Finance Committee is 8-5 [Concertación -Right] so that even the absence of a couple of legislators won't affect the transmission of [financial] bills. There will always be a Concertación majority there. If one is missing, OK, there's still -or better, even up to 6-5 -you could be missing two people without affecting the majority.
[In the 1993-97 Congress] in the Senate, the standing Finance Committee is the only one ... with a Concertación majority. That is, there are three from the Concertación and two from the opposition. [When an additional eight senators are named to serve on the Joint Finance Commitee, to bring the numbers of representatives from each chamber to an equal thirteen,] the other eight are named by votes in the Senate Chamber, more or less in proportion to the senators; and because there are eight, four come from the Concertación and four from the opposition; so the entire Senate contingent ends up 7-6. But in the previous Congress it wasn't like this. At that time ... the other eight were three and five, respectively, such that whole Senate contingent was 6-7 ... At any rate, it doesn't matter what the distribution of senators is because the composition of the Chamber's contingent will give us a majority in the Joint Finance Committee.
Palma's extended analysis touches on some key points about the role of committees in legislative policymaking. First, his primary concern is with the nature of committee majorities -both within each chamber and in conference -in terms of coalition membership. Second, the Finance Committees in each chamber play the role of control committees over a wide range of policy jurisdictions, by vetting all legislation that has an impact on the budget.
All the above reflect on the level of experience and expertise that accumulate within the committee system. Committee expertise is widely regarded as an indicator of a legislature's capacity as an independent policymaking institution (Polsby 1968; Strom 1990; Norton 1994; Schuttemeyer 1994 ). On the rationale that experience is a good measure of expertise, the committees in Table 7 are listed in order of the rate at which members from the first period who were reelected to the Chamber were reassigned for the second period. Thus, all seven Finance Committee members from 1997 who returned to the Chamber in 1998 were reassigned to Finance; seven of eight in the case of Constitution and Justice, etc. The resulting rank order is consistent both with the accounts Palma and other deputies (León 1998; Kuschel 1998 ) about the centrality of the Finance Committees, and with conventional intuitions about the complexity and salience of the various policy jurisdictions in Chile. The committees with the highest reassignment rates -Finance, Constitution, Health, Defense -all deal with complicated policy areas that have been heavily contested in the 1990s (Baldez + Carey, 1999; Weyland 1995) .
The data presented thus far demonstrate that the Chilean Congress is highly professionalized -particularly for a young legislature -and that its committee system is accumulating substantial expertise, and is organized and dominated by the majority coalition.
Within the comparative study of legislatures, these are all regarded as indicators of strong legislative capacity. The accounts reviewed thus far suggest the importance of coalitions in of determining committee membership and performance; but they do not provide sufficiently finegrained information to distinguish clearly the relative importance of the traditional parties versus the broader coalitions in making policy. To address that issue, I turn to the subject of floor voting in the Chamber.
Legislative Voting
Academic studies of the U.S. Congress have long focused extensively on roll call voting behavior, and particularly on levels of party discipline (Anderson, Watts and Wilcox 1966; Brady 1973; Collie 1984; Cox and McCubbins 1993) . Systematic analysis of partisanship and legislative voting in Latin American has begun only more recently, as legislatures have become more prominent in policymaking and data have become more accessible Figueiredo 1995 and Ames 1997; Mainwaring 1997; Mainwaring and Liñán 1997) . In this chapter, I present analysis of a dataset of all 215 votes recorded in the Chamber of Deputies' Boletín de Sesiones, from the 40 sessions of Legislatura Ordinaria (May 22 -September 9, 1997) and the 29 sessions of Legislatura Ordinaria No.336 (September 30, 1997 -January 21, 1998. The main products of this analysis are indexes of voting unity within parties and coalitions, which can range from 0 (the party or coalition is evenly divided between voting "aye" and "nay") to 1.0 (the party or coalition This formula is based on the assumption that a measure is approved as long as more legislators 11 vote "aye" than "nay." In some cases, however, legislative procedures establish more stringent requirements for a measure's approval -e.g. an extraordinary majority of the entire chamber's membership. In Chile, such supermajority requirements exist for changes to the constitution and to organic law, and applied to ten of the votes included in the dataset analyzed here. The modified formula for calculating the unity index to accommodate such votes is discussed in Carey (N. is perfectly united, whether for "aye" or "nay"). The unity index is weighted according to the rationale that we should be more interested in cohesiveness the more critical the vote; and that both attendance by legislators and the overall closeness of the vote are indicators of critical-ness.
Thus, in calculating the index, votes that are sparsely attended and/or lopsided one way or the other are discounted. The motivation for and properties of the unity index are discussed at length in Carey (N.d.); for present purposes, however, it will be sufficient to present the basic formula, which is:
where: ATTEND = % of legislators voting on issue j j CLOSE = 1-*%aye -%nay*, for legislature as a whole on issue j j 11 UNITY = *%aye -% nay*, within coalition or party i on issue j ij Thus, the extent to which coalition (or party) unity on a given vote contributes to the overall index score depends on how heavily attended a vote is, and how close it is to a tie.
In order to get a feel for the data, it is helpful to examine the distributions of votes by ATTEND and CLOSE. Figures 1 and 2 confirm the expectations that most of the votes in this dataset were sparsely attended and unsuspenseful.
[Figures 1 and 2]
ATTEND was between 33% (the minimum quorum) and 50% of deputies on more than half the votes; and on more than half the losing side attracted less than 10% support (yielding CLOSE
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For the 1993-97 Congress, four candidates without party affiliations were elected as 13 Independents on lists run by the coalition of the Right, as were two candidates from the minor party, the Unión del Centro Centro (UCC). Two candidates from the Partido Radical (PR) and one from the Partido Democrática de la Izquierda (PDI) were elected on Concertación lists. For the purposes of calculating UNITY indexes, these legislators are included in the scores for each coalition. Separate indexes are calculated for each of the major parties within each coalition. Later, when indexes are calculated for crosspartisan blocs both within and across coalitions, only the members of the major parties are included.
Roughly, a score of .700 indicates that 85% the set of legislators in question voted together on 14 votes of "average" critical-ness. The idea of an average, of course, entails that votes that are most divisive across the legislature as a whole are given the most weight, so scores should be interpreted cautiously.
scores between zero and 0.2). It is noteworthy, however, that there is no correlation between ATTEND and CLOSE. Both variables, therefore, appear to bring to the weighted index independent and important information about the critical-ness of votes.
[ Figure 3 ]
The first cut is to examine index scores across the two major coalitions and their main component parties.
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[ Table 8 ] Table 8 provides a good deal of information about the levels of UNITY within both coalitions and within the major parties of which they are composed, both for all votes analyzed, and for subsets of votes coded by policy issue area. The index scores reported for the whole chamber give an 14 indication of how hotly contested votes in each issue area were, with lower scores there indicating that votes tended to be more divisive. As one might expect, votes on foreign policy and on miscellaneous (e.g. approving construction of monuments to a 19 Century priest and a policeman th killed in the line of duty; renaming a city park) were the most consensual, whereas votes on social and military issues, and to a lesser extent economic matters, were the least.
At the level of coalitions and the parties that comprise them, the first thing to note is that scores are higher within the parties than within the coalitions overall. This is necessary if common party membership is to mean anything as a predictor of legislative behavior. Also, arithmetically, the index score of any group cannot be higher than the mean of index scores of its component sub-weighted according to the number of members of the sub-groups. If all parties within a coalition 15 were precisely equally disunited on every vote in the dataset, then all their UNITY scores would be equal, and would equal that of their coalition as a whole. On the other hand, if members of the same party are at all more likely to vote together than to vote with members of other parties within their coalition, then the UNITY scores of each party will be higher than that of the coalition. It is also worth noting that the parties for which index scores are calculated make up the vast majority of members of each coalition, but not all. The handful of minor party legislators and independents in each coalition are included in the coalition scores. For independents and parties with lone legislators, it would be meaningless to calculate their party UNITY scores.
groups. Given this, it is remarkable how little difference there is between the overall 15 cohesiveness of the coalitions and of their component parties -particularly within the Concertación, where cohesiveness at the coalition level is not much below that at the partisan level. Table 8 also gives some idea about the relative divisiveness of different policy issues within each of the parties and coalitions. Both coalitions are relatively unified around economic issues, with the Concertación also highly unified on foreign policy and the few miscellaneous bills. Big differences between the unity at the coalition level and at the level of component parties indicate issue areas that are internally divisive across parties within coalitions. For example, the two main parties within the coalition of the right are each highly cohesive on foreign policy votes, but the coalition as a whole is not, indicating stark differences at the partisan level on that issue area. The right is similarly (although not as starkly) divided on economic votes and on government reform votes. On the few miscellaneous votes, the UDI is perfectly united, whereas the RN is internally divided. In the Concertación, no issue area stands out as clearly dividing unified parties against each other within the coalition.
The next question is how we might draw on the unity index to learn about the relative importance of party versus coalition to explain legislative voting. Consider an alternative cut on the data, distinguishing among various cross-party blocs. Based on Chilean political debate, electoral platforms, and political history, I posit the following spatial sequence of the major legislative parties along a standard left-right ideological dimension:
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Of course, ideological distance between two parties -not just simple adjacence and common 16 coalition membership -might account for higher or lower unity in voting among their deputies. The idea of comparing the importance of adjacence with that of coalition membership in determining index scores implicitly assumes a uniform separation across the ideological spectrum. In a future revision, I hope to obtain and incorporate data with expert opinions of ideological placement of each of the five main parties. My expectation is that, if such data exist, the two "border" parties within each coalition, toward the center of the ideological spectrunm (DC and RN), will actually be no further from each other than they are from their nearest coalition partner. If this is the case, it will strengthen the argument that it is coalition membership, rather than inherent ideological location, that is driving coalition cohesiveness.
If the coalitions do not constrain the voting behavior of legislators, then the boundary between coalitions should not tell us any more about the voting patterns of deputies on opposing sides than should the boundary between any two adjacent parties. That is, if the coalitions are not important in structuring legislative behavior, then the cohesiveness of deputies from ideologically adjacent parties should not not depend on whether they are also from the same electoral coalition.
On the other hand, if the electoral coalitions are important, then UNITY between two adjacent parties within a coalition should be greater than that between two adjacent parties across coalitions.
16 Table 9 compares index scores for legislators from every pair of parties, distinguishing according to whether the pairs are ideologically adjacent and whether they are members of the same major coalition. The first conclusion is that common coalition membership matters much more than ideological adjacence in determining whether legislators from different parties vote together. Among adjacent parties, the mean overall index score for those in the same coalition is .674, whereas the index for the "border parties" from the two coalitions, DC -RN is .376. It is not surprising, of course, that the mean index score for non-adjacent parties in different coalitions is quite low (.371); however, the contrast with the score for the only two non-adjacent parties within a coalition (PS -DC, at .699) is still striking.
[ Table 9 ]
The scores broken down by issue area in Table 9 also indicate on which matters some parties build cross-coalitional alliances, and therefore perhaps, where the potential "wedge" issues are that could splinter coalitions. The high scores for the RN with any of the Concertación parties on foreign affairs suggest that that issue area could split the coalition of the right, if foreign policy became a sufficiently salient policy dimension.
At the most basic level, these results demonstrate that legislators from the two main coalitions in Chile tend to vote with each other and that the coalitions also tend to vote against each other. This is consistent with Magar, Rosenblum, and Samuels's (1998) and Dow's (1998) spatial models predicting polarized and cohesive coalition competition in elections. 1996) , and later to a more subtle "tacit agreement" within the coalition of the Right on cohesiveness (1998). The Executive Secretary of the PPD bancada in the Chamber, gives a similarly ambiguous account, referring to a "moral obligation to support the Concertación" and to "discipline," but downplaying the imminence of explicit sanctions against those who vote against the coalition (Canales 1998 ).
The first conclusion that is evident from the floor voting data is that the coalitions are central in structuring legislative behavior. They may do so by providing discipline, which implies exerting pressure on deputies to vote together, or by coordinating the legislative agenda. The interviews suggest that discipline at the coalition level is a function of moral obligation rather than by sanctions imposed on maverick legislators. An alternative source of discipline is the electoral incentive under the M=2 system for candidates from the same coalition to stake similar ideological positions while distinguishing themselves from the candidates of the other main coalition, as implied by the formal models of Dow (1998) and Magar, Rosenblum, and Samuels (1998) A second implication, following from the cohesiveness of coalitions in the Chamber, is that the existence of non-elected senators means that much of the most important deliberation and negotiation within the legislature should take place between, rather than within, chambers. In the absence of non-elected senators, Chile's would be an example of congruous bicameralism, in which one would expect majorities in each chamber to generate similar decisions, because the electoral systems for the Chamber and Senate are identical (with the caveat that Senate districts are larger) (Lijphart 1984) . The non-elected senators, however, change things substantially. The initial cohort had been appointed by Pinochet himself, and swung the Senate majority from the Concertación to the right. The result was that, for the first eight years after the transition, interchamber negotiations were the principle forum of bargaining and compromise in the Chilean
Congress. This is underscored by Rossana Costa, an economist for a conservative think tank and lobbying organization, again with respect to budget legislation:
How would you characterize the relationship between the Chamber and the executive with respect to the budget? Costa: , the Chamber reached an agreement with the executive and, because the opposition [coalition of the right] is a minority, there is no reason to debate anything. It's voted on and it's done. The source of compromise is the Senate, because there, in some cases it's necessary to reach an agreement with the opposition, and that's what produces negotation, conversation, discussion -not in the Chamber.
The term of the original cohort of appointed senators ended in early 1998, at which point nine new senators were named, and the retired General Pinochet himself assumed his seat as a former president. Because of the constraints of the appointment process (see above), the ideological bent of the group appointed in 1998 is still substantially to the right of the Concertación majority among elected legislators. Thus, the phenomenon of divided government through a divided
Congress is likely to persist into the next decade.
Conclusion
Prior to 1973, the Chilean Congress was long regarded as the most powerful legislature in Latin America, a forum for negotiation and bargaining among strong parties, and a significant counterweight to the executive branch in shaping policy. Upon the return to democracy in 1990, the legacy of a long authoritarian hiatus, a new constitution that provides strong legislative powers to the president, and a new electoral system all raised questions about the role of Congress.
Recent research confirms the importance of presidential agenda control in shaping policy outcomes (Siavelis 1998; Baldez + Carey 1999) . Nevertheless, according to the standard criteria by which legislatures are compared, Chile's Congress is reestablishing itself as an unusually professionalized and technically competent legislature. Politicians endeavor -generally successfully -to build careers through reelction to Congress. They pursue these careers through party and coalitions that have been stable throughout the post-transition period. Much of the substantive oversight and policymaking work of the legislature, moreover, is delegated to a set of standing committees, and stable membership on these committees (particularly those that deal with the most important policies) means that these intralegislative institutions are accumulating substantial policy expertise.
All these are widely regarded as signs of legislative capacity and autonomy.
The most persistent and controversial question with respect to the Chilean legislature in the post-transition era, however, is whether the party system is fundamentally different from the pretransition era. Specifically, are the two major coalitions merely marriages of convenience, made necessary by the method of aggregating votes imposed by the outgoing dictatorship, but otherwise not important in structuring legislative behavior? The dominant theme among analysts of the posttransition party system has been continuity with pre-Pinochet Chile (Valenzuela 1994; Scully 1995; Siavelis 1997) . The data presented here, however, suggest otherwise. In the first place, even either of the major coalitions exploded tomorrow (as appears possible in the run-up to the 1999 presidential election), they have already both proven far more durable than any of the coalitions identified by Valenzuela (1994) how Congress as a whole will divide when it comes time to vote than do partisan divisions.
To sum up, the new electoral system forces parties to coalesce, and the coalitions matter to the way Congress operates and to the sort of representation legislators provide. The Chilean case provides strong evidence for the impact of institutional design on political behavior. 
The number of incumbents does not always correspond exactly to the number of legislators elected by each party from Table 1, 
